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INTRODUCTION
Certain passages in Adolf Berle’s essay on Corporate Capitalism
and “The City of God” that once seemed musty and redolent of a bygone
era are now eerily timely.1 Like current critics, Berle chides corporate
leaders who think they can simply mind their own business, oblivious to
larger social concerns. “For the fact seems to be that the really great
* Thanks to Owen Alderson, Steve Bainbridge, Bill Bratton, Jill Fisch, John Inazu, Elizabeth Pollman,
Russell Powell, Asaf Raz, and participants in the Berle XII symposium for their helpful comments and
discussion; to David Wreesman for excellent research assistance; and to the University of
Pennsylvania Carey Law School for generous summer funding. Special thanks to Curtis Chang, who
inspired several of the key ideas of this Article.
1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 164 (1954). The essay,
first delivered as a talk, is the final chapter of the book and its title is the name of this symposium.

155

156

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:155

corporat[e] managements have reached a position for the first time in their
history in which they must consciously take account of philosophical
considerations,” Berle wrote nearly seventy years ago.2 “They must
consider the kind of community in which they have faith, and which they
will serve, and which they intend to . . . construct and maintain.”3 To be
sure, the argument could use some minor updating. Terms such as
“philosophy” and “philosophical considerations” would need to go. But if
we substituted the words “social justice” or “social responsibility” and
updated his pronouns, Berle’s essay could easily appear in today’s papers.4
Berle’s remarks on the social obligations of corporate managers are
founded on a theory about the nature of publicly held corporations. The
authority exercised by corporate leaders, Berle argues, is not just a matter
of power; the “real control which guides or limits their economic and
social action is the real, though undefined and tacit, philosophy of the
[people] who compose them.”5 It is, in a sense, their moral compass. This
moral compass, Berle suggests, is like the City of God in Augustine’s
theological masterpiece, which is the eternal, heavenly counterpart to the
feckless and impermanent City of Man.6
The underlying “philosophy” animates, or should animate, not only
the managers, but also the corporation as a whole and corporate America
more generally. “Our grandfathers quarreled with corporations because, as
the phrase went, they were ‘soulless,’” according to Berle.7 “But out of the
common denominator of the decision-making machinery, some sort of
consensus of mind is emerging, by compulsion as it were, which for good
or ill is acting surprisingly like a collective soul.”8
In this Article, I take Berle’s cue in several respects. Most
importantly, I will look to Augustine for guidance in developing insights
into the nature of the corporation—in particular, corporate personhood.
2. Id. at 166.
3. Id. at 166–67. Berle capped off this argument with his famous concession that E. Merrick
Dodd’s earlier contention that corporate powers are “held in trust for the entire community” had
prevailed, “at least for the time being,” over Berle’s argument that the “powers [are] in trust for
shareholders.” Id. at 169.
4. See, e.g., Justin Baer, Amid Lower Returns, Investors Press Buffett on Social Issues, WALL
ST. J., May 1, 2021, at A1.
5. BERLE, supra note 1, at 180.
6. Id. at 178–79 (referencing Augustine and The City of God). Berle does not cite to a specific
translation of The City of God. The translation on my desk, which could conceivably be the one he
used, is SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD (Marcus Dods trans., 1950) [hereinafter SAINT
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD]. It should perhaps be mentioned that Berle’s use of Augustine’s
concept of the “City of God” is idiosyncratic, as in his characterization of that eternal perspective as a
“philosophy” that can be crafted by people. He alerts the reader that he will be taking liberties by
putting City of God in quotes throughout. See, e.g., BERLE, supra note 1, at 175.
7. BERLE, supra note 1, at 183.
8. Id.
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Whereas Berle drew inspiration from The City of God,9 however, I will
look to a different Augustinian masterpiece, The Trinity, which has played
a pivotal role in Christians’ understanding of who God is.10 Christian
theology, as brilliantly explicated in The Trinity, states that God consists
of three different persons—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—but
is a single divine being.11
Drawing on recent work by the theologian Curtis Chang, I argue that
corporate personhood has similar qualities, and that the analogy is not
accidental. According to Christian scripture, the universe is a reflection of
God. If this is true, the echoes—in particular, echoes of the Trinity—
extend even to human institutions such as corporations.12 Much as
theologically orthodox Christians understand God to be both one and
three, I argue that corporations are best seen as both a single entity and
through the lens of their individual managers and shareholders. To frame
my discussion of the Trinitarian nature of the corporation, I focus most
extensively on the two recent Supreme Court cases that have drawn
renewed attention to these issues: Citizens United, which struck down a
campaign finance restraint on for-profit corporations,13 and Hobby Lobby,
which held that some for-profit corporations are entitled to religious
liberty protections.14 But the analysis extends beyond the cases and is
intended to speak to the nature of corporate personhood more generally.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the debate over
corporate personhood that was prompted by Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby. Both sides in the debate work from implausible concepts of the
corporation. Conservatives characterize corporations as having rights but
few responsibilities, whereas liberals believe they have responsibilities but
few rights.
Part II develops the Trinitarian concept of the corporation. As those
who are familiar with the historical debate over corporate personhood will
recognize, the Trinitarian concept of the corporation can be seen as
combining attributes of each of the two most prominent traditional
theories, one of which characterizes corporations as the aggregate of their
individual shareholders, while the other sees them as a “real entity.” The

9. See generally SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 6.
10. See generally SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE TRINITY (Edmund Hill trans., 1991) [hereinafter
SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE TRINITY].
11. As Augustine puts it, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit “in the inseparable equality of one
substance present a divine unity; and therefore are not three gods but one God.” Id. at 69. For more
detailed discussion, see infra Section II(A).
12. The argument is developed in infra Part II.
13. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
14. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
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distinction is that the Trinitarian concept insists that both theories are
needed, rather than one or the other.
After outlining a Trinitarian conception of the corporation, Part III
explores its implications for a variety of issues, including: the personhood
of “closely held” corporations, whether noncorporate entities have
personhood, and whether a corporation can have a religious identity. The
final section returns to Berle’s analysis to discuss the current debate over
corporate political involvement.
I. THE POLARIZED CORPORATION
Although the status of corporations has been debated throughout
America’s history, the current controversy was triggered by the Supreme
Court’s Citizens United and Hobby Lobby decisions. In Citizens United,
the Court held that free speech rights under the First Amendment extend
to for-profit corporations and were violated by a campaign finance law
prohibiting corporate expenditures made by a small advocacy corporation
favoring a particular candidate on the eve of an election.15 In Hobby Lobby,
the Court ruled that for-profit corporations are covered by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and that the contraception mandate in
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) violated the religious freedom of
religiously oriented for-profit corporations that objected to the mandate on
religious grounds.16
Both sides in the polarized debate rely on highly selective
assumptions about the nature of a corporation. Conservatives often portray
corporations as having robust rights but few responsibilities; for liberals,
they have few rights but abundant responsibilities.17 The contrast can be
seen both in the majority and dissenting opinions in Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby, and in the scholarly literature. It is especially stark in the
popular media.
The discussion that follows contrasts the polarized depictions of
corporate personhood by evaluating the conservative and liberal
perspectives in turn.
A. The Conservative Perspective: Rights Without Responsibilities
The most striking feature of the conservative Justices’ majority
opinions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby is how little they have to say
about the nature of corporate personhood. In each case, the Justices focus
much of their attention on a particular type of corporation that all would
15. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371.
16. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 707–08, 730–31.
17. Thanks to Curtis Chang for suggesting this dichotomy.
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agree is protected and reason from that to a conclusion that reaches all forprofit corporations.
Justice Kennedy’s touchstone in his majority opinion in Citizens
United is media corporations. “Under the Government’s reasoning,” he
warned, which justified limits on corporate political expenditures on
“antidistortion” grounds, “wealthy media corporations could have their
voices diminished to put them on par with other media entities.”18 Since
for-profit media corporations clearly should be and are protected under the
First Amendment, he suggests here and elsewhere in the opinion, other
for-profit corporations must also enjoy this protection.
In Hobby Lobby, the majority once again focused on an entity
everyone agrees is protected to do much of its interpretive work. Here, the
entities that RFRA clearly intended to protect were churches. Much as it
seems obvious that media corporations must be covered by the First
Amendment’s speech protections, it is similarly evident that RFRA is
intended to safeguard the religious freedom of churches and nonprofit
religious organizations as well as individuals. The language of RFRA
creates an apparent conundrum in this regard; it speaks of “persons,”
which does not call churches and other collective organizations
immediately to mind.19 But the Dictionary Act defines “person” to include
corporations as well as natural persons.20 Because churches are usually set
up as corporations under state law,21 it is quite clear that RFRA covers
churches, as everyone assumed it did.
Unlike the corporations in Hobby Lobby, churches and other
religious organizations are ordinarily non-profit corporations. In his
majority opinion in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito recognized the distinction,
but swatted it away as irrelevant for RFRA purposes. If RFRA covers
persons and a corporation is a person, he reasoned, RFRA must include
both for-profit and non-profit corporations: “No known understanding of
the term ‘person’ includes some but not all corporations.”22 Although
“person” “sometimes is limited to natural persons[, . . .] no conceivable
definition of the term includes natural persons and non-profit corporations,
but not for-profit corporations.”23
18. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352.
19. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 705 (quoting RFRA prohibition on substantially burdening “a
person’s exercise of religion”).
20. Id. at 707–08 (quoting the Dictionary Act definition of “person,” which “include[s]
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals”).
21. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 1181,
1184 (2003) (noting that most churches are corporations).
22. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 708.
23. Id.
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In the brief passages that do address the nature of the corporation,
Hobby Lobby treats corporations simply as projections of the individuals
who control them. Justice Alito wrote that “Congress provided protection
for people like the Hahns and [the] Greens [the families who owned the
businesses at issue] by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included
corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’ But it is important to
keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for
human beings.”24 It is not clear what this concept of the corporation means
for a publicly held corporation that is not associated with recognizable
founders. Hobby Lobby acknowledges this issue but treats it as
unimportant in practice. According to the Court, “the idea that unrelated
shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set of
stakeholders—would agree to run a corporation under the same religious
beliefs seems improbable.”25
The analyses in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby left the impression
that corporations have the same kinds of rights as individuals, and that
these rights cannot be denied to for-profit corporations unless there is a
categorical basis for withholding the rights. The Court was not willing to
carve out one group of corporations on pragmatic grounds in either case,
for-profit media corporations in Citizens United and non-profit
corporations in Hobby Lobby, in a fashion that would invite greater
regulation of most for-profit corporations. The expansive vision of
corporate rights that emerges from this approach suggests that for-profit
corporations carry rights but are not burdened by similarly robust
responsibilities.
Although the rights-without-responsibilities conception of
corporations is implicit and qualified in the Supreme Court cases,26 it often
appears more directly in conservative commentary. For example, in
responding to New York Times criticism of Citizens United, a Wall Street
Journal editor characterized the “notion that only certain types of
corporations are ‘deserving of constitutional protection’ [as] pernicious. It
recasts freedom of expression as a privilege rather than a right.”27
Similarly, during Mitt Romney’s campaign for President, he famously

24. Id. at 706.
25. Id. at 717.
26. In Hobby Lobby, for instance, the Court did not say that it would be impermissible for
Congress to expand religious freedom protection for non-profits but not for for-profit corporations.
The Court simply concluded that the term Congress used in RFRA—”person”— cannot be construed
as applying to non-profit corporations but not for-profit corporations. Id. at 706–09.
27. James Taranto, The Privilege to Speak, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2012,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323713104578131200617146638
[https://perma.cc/6GUK-EZ3Q].
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insisted that “corporations are people, my friend,” in response to a heckler
who had criticized corporations.28
Conservative, corporate law scholars have somewhat similar
tendencies but in more nuanced forms. One such scholar has embraced a
so-called “reverse veil piercing” perspective, which posits that a
corporation’s individual shareholders should be seen as projecting their
individual rights into the corporate entity.29 The same prominent
commentator elsewhere (and earlier) criticized those who insist on
corporate social responsibilities as statist and asserted that “the
progressive project’s basic flaw is its willingness to invoke the coercive
power of the state in ways that deny the rights of [men and women] acting
individually, or collectively through voluntary associations, to order
society.”30 Overall, the conservative perspective tends to be long on
corporate rights and comparatively short on corporate responsibilities.
This is a tendency, not an iron law. Conservatives do acknowledge the
need for some regulation—such as regulation intended to ensure that
corporations internalize costs that they impose on third parties.31 But
conservatives are generally more enthusiastic about corporate rights.
B. The Liberal Perspective: Responsibilities Without Rights
The dissenting liberal Justices offered a starkly different vision of the
corporation in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby than their conservative
counterparts. In each case, they emphasized the difference between the
corporate entity and the individuals who own and manage it, and the need
for regulatory oversight.
After pointing out that early corporations were “authorized by grant
of a special legislative charter,” Justice Stevens, author of the principal
dissent in Citizens United, concluded that the Framers “took it as a given
that corporations could be comprehensively regulated in the service of the
28. See, e.g., Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says “Corporations Are People,” WASH. POST (Aug.
11,
2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-says-corporations-arepeople/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html [https://perma.cc/N9UA-MF26].
29. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief
in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (2014). The principal objective
of the “reverse veil piercing” approach is to justify a corporation’s assertion of its shareholders’
religious freedom rights. For a politically liberal argument that only associations, not other
organizations, should be permitted to assert the rights of their members, see Brandon L. Garrett, The
Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014).
30. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 895 (1997).
31. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night-Watchman
State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39, 45 (2015) (noting that it is uncontroversial, including among
conservative corporate law scholars, that “in appropriate cases, society uses law to force corporations
to internalize [costs]”).
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public welfare.”32 Although corporations no longer receive special
charters like in the Framers’ era, the principle endured, as reflected in the
campaign finance regulation imposed on corporations throughout the
twentieth century.33 Justice Stevens also noted “that corporations have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. . . . [T]hey
are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom
our Constitution was established.”34
In her Hobby Lobby dissent, Justice Ginsburg sounded similar
themes. The absence of earlier cases in which for-profit corporations were
deemed to have religious freedom rights is “just what one would expect,
for the exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial
legal entities.”35
Liberal pundits make the case for limiting the rights of for-profit
corporations in a less nuanced, more colorful fashion. One commentator
wrote that Hobby Lobby reflected one of “the most dangerous right-wing
civil rights obsessions of our times: . . . the ambition of large, for-profit
corporations to see themselves as people, with faith, convictions, and
consciences.”36 Another commentator wrote that “[i]t should not be
controversial to believe that corporations owe some measure of
accountability to the society that allows them to accumulate massive
wealth.”37
Liberal corporate law experts develop similar themes in more subtle
ways. These scholars sometimes echo the dissenting Justices’ contention
that a corporation does not have beliefs or a conscience, and thus cannot
have a religious identity, then go on to argue that a religious identity would
be inconsistent with basic corporate law principles. The best-known
Delaware jurist and scholar contends that, in Delaware, the leading state
of incorporation, “the board of directors of a for-profit
corporation . . . must, within the limits of its legal discretion, treat
stockholder welfare as the only end, considering other interests only to the

32. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 428 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 433 (noting that “the express distinction between corporate and individual political
spending on elections stretches back to 1907, when Congress passed the Tillman Act”).
34. Id. at 466.
35. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 752 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg also quotes Justice Stevens’ statement that corporations “have no consciences, no
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” Id. (quoting 558 U.S. at 466).
36. Dahlia Lithwick, Un-People, SLATE (Dec. 3, 2013), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-corporate-personhood-the-alarming-conservative-crusade-todeclare-everything-except-people-a-legal-person.html [https://perma.cc/ZL9J-WQRJ].
37. Katrina vanden Heuvel, Big Business Is Suddenly Showing a Conscience. But Is That
Enough?, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/27/bigbusiness-is-suddenly-showing-conscience-is-that-enough/ [https://perma.cc/2QVJ-WUZU].
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extent that doing so is rationally related to stockholder welfare.”38
According to this reasoning, pursuing a religious mission would divert a
corporation from its profit-seeking mission, and thus is inherently
problematic.39
A second liberal perspective starts with the conservative Justices’
suggestion that the corporations in Hobby Lobby were a projection of
individuals and suggests that corporations generally should not be entitled
to exercise constitutional rights unless they fit this paradigm. One
prominent corporate law scholar writes:
When a corporation can credibly be understood as representing the
interests of natural persons who, individually, have valid claims to
First Amendment protections and who associated with the
corporation for some expressive purpose, [then] the right of the
corporation to carry out that expressive activity should be protected
by the First Amendment.40

The only corporations that would qualify for protection are those
with “an identifiable and relatively stable group of actual natural persons
who are citizens or residents of the United States and who can credibly be
said to be represented by the corporation in question.”41 Although a

38. Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and
Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 107 (2015). Chief Justice Strine does acknowledge
that a charter provision could alter this. Id. at 109 (stating that “if a corporation wishes to have a
religious purpose, the traditional method is to set forth that purpose in the corporation’s certificate of
incorporation”).
39. Benefit corporations (B-corp), which the majority mentioned in Hobby Lobby, pose an
obvious difficulty for this line of reasoning. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 712–13 (“Over half of the
States, for instance, now recognize the ‘benefit corporation,’ a dual-purpose entity that seeks to
achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its owners.”). B-corp provisions expressly invite
for-profit corporations to pursue a social or religious mission. The usual response to this development
is to characterize B-corps as a special case. Strine, supra note 38, at 107 (characterizing Benefit
Corporations as “created by statute precisely to enable corporations to consider other constituencies
without running afoul of the law”). But one of the principal critiques of B-corps has always been that
the same objectives can be achieved with an ordinary for-profit corporation. See Justin Blount &
Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable Solution to A Non-Existent Problem,
44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 663–69 (2013) (arguing that existing mechanisms of corporate law, such as
amendments to articles of incorporation, permit a corporation to pursue a social mission).
40. Margaret M. Blair, Corporations and Expressive Rights: How the Lines Should be Drawn,
65 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 288 (2016). Professor Blair also suggests it may sometimes be appropriate
for corporations to be accorded rights if this serves an “instrumental” purpose, such as giving listeners
access to speech that qualifies as especially relevant. Id. In an earlier article, Professors Blair and
Pollman made similar points but framed them more as descriptions of the existing Supreme Court
caselaw than as normatively desirable tests. See Margaret Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative
Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1735 (2015).
41. Blair, supra note 40, at 290.
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family-owned business might qualify as a person under this standard, few
other for-profit businesses would meet this stringent test.42
In contrast to their skepticism about corporate rights, liberal
corporate law experts often are much more bullish about imposing new
responsibilities on corporations. The same scholar-judge who worries that
corporate rights would interfere with directors’ obligations to pursue the
interests of shareholders, expresses optimism (in work with two coauthors) that social objectives, such as concern for employees and the
environment, that might compete with shareholder profitability can be
imposed and regulated by corporate law.43 Rather than being a “novel and
enhanced” concept, the new emphasis on employee, environmental, social,
and governance factors (EESG) should simply be viewed as a feature of
“the pre-existing duty of corporations and their directors to implement and
monitor compliance programs to ensure that the company honors its legal
obligations.”44 Overall, the liberal perspective tends to be long on
corporate oversight, and comparatively short on corporate rights.
II. THE CORPORATION AS A SPIRITUAL ENTITY
As those who are familiar with the history of corporate personhood
will have noticed, the conservative and liberal concepts of the corporation
bear a resemblance to two historical theories of the corporation that were
debated in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Conservatives tend
to gravitate toward the “aggregate” or contract theory of the firm, while
liberals tend to adopt a “real entity” view of the corporation (at least on
some issues). A third theory, also congenial to a few liberals, but much
less prominent today, characterizes the corporation as a concession or
sovereign grant.
According to the aggregate theory, a corporation is the sum of the
individuals who comprise it.45 It does not have a separate existence. The
majority opinion in Hobby Lobby seems to have adopted this view of the

42. Two prominent public law scholars make a similar argument in an article rejecting the
separateness of religious institutions. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against
Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013). “Even if it turns out that religious groups are
entitled to exemptions from [the Affordable Care Act’s contraception] mandate, . . . the reason will be
that the individuals composing those groups have been burdened in their free exercise of religion . . . .
That an institution is implicated in that exercise does not alter the underlying claim.” Id. at 984.
43. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith, & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together:
A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG
Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885 (2021).
44. Id. at 1887.
45. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
1629, 1641 (2011) (characterizing the aggregate theory as having “roots in a view of the corporation
as a partnership or contract among the shareholders”).
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corporation,46 perhaps unintentionally, and there are hints of this
perspective in Citizens United as well.47 Many of the nineteenth century
corporate personhood cases and most of the Supreme Court’s more recent
cases use aggregate theory language.48
By contrast, the real entity theory insists that corporations have an
existence separate and distinct from the individuals that comprise them.
Echoing this perspective, liberal scholars generally assume corporations
are more than the sum of the individuals that comprise them.49
The third theory of the corporation as a “concession” or “sovereign
grant” was very important in the early nineteenth century when states
exercised careful control over the corporate charters they granted, often
using them for public purposes such as constructing bridges or turnpikes.50
With the advent of general incorporation statutes, which made it easy for
anyone to create a corporation, the sovereign grant theory declined in
importance.51
The choice of perspective has had political implications from the
beginning, but the politics have proven malleable. In early nineteenth
century Germany, where the modern debate began, the real entity
perspective was advocated by Otto Gierke, a conservative.52 For Gierke,
corporations were a bulwark against the state.53 In the United States, by
contrast, the real entity perspective has often proven congenial to liberals.
In 1926, the philosopher John Dewey insisted in a famous article that any

46. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706–07 (2014) (“When rights,
whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose [is] to protect the rights
of [the people associated with them].”).
47. As when Justice Kennedy characterized corporations as “associations” of individuals. See,
e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010).
48. For the history, see ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES
WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 66–68 (2018) (describing this approach in Bank of United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809), and referring to it as “veil piercing”); Pollman, supra note 45, at 1636–
46.
49. I say “generally” because some liberal scholars employ aggregate language for specific
purposes such as limiting corporate rights, see generally Blair, supra note 40, and at least one appears
to gravitate toward the “concession” theory of the corporation described in the text that follows. See
infra note 77 (discussing Leo Strine’s perspective).
50. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 45, at 1634–35 (describing “concession” theory).
51. Id.
52. See generally Francis P. Sempa, Conservative: The Fight for a Tradition, N.Y.J. OF BOOKS
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.nyjournalofbooks.com/book-review/conservatism-fight-tradition
[https://perma.cc/AS4Q-C5JP] (describing Gierke’s conservatism); see also Gregory A. Mark, The
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1469 (1987)
(arguing that Gierke wanted to legitimate intermediate institutions).
53. For an elegant summary and defense of Gierke’s real entity theory by a contemporary
conservative British philosopher, see Roger Scruton, Gierke and the Corporate Person, THE
PHILOSOPHER ON DOVER BEACH: ESSAYS 56 (1990).
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of the theories can be used to justify any conclusion.54 Dewey did not
explicitly say the debate was pointless, but this was the obvious
implication of his analysis. At least in part as a result of Dewey’s article
and the legal realist perspective it reflected, American legal scholars lost
interest in corporate personhood for decades.55 It took the controversy
spurred by Citizens United and Hobby Lobby to renew interest in this
debate.
A century later, Dewey’s critique still has bite. The aggregate theory
might seem to suggest that a publicly held corporation cannot exercise
religious freedom given that the numerous shareholders of these
corporations are not likely to hold a single, coherent perspective on
religion or any other issue. Yet, as several scholars who endorse the
aggregate theory have pointed out, the incorporators of a corporation
create a framework that has rules of decision for adopting policies on
behalf of all shareholders.56 It provides for the election of directors to
represent the shareholders and for processes to amend the bylaws or
charter.57 Although a shareholder may disagree with the principles adopted
by the corporation and the process may deviate from ideal voting in
important respects,58 shareholders are deemed to consent to the
corporation’s principles and voting process when they buy a stock in the
corporation.
Given the shape-shifting quality of theories of corporate personhood
and the limits to the explanatory power of any of the three, it has been
persuasively argued that each of the theories is lacking. As one scholar
puts it, “None of these conceptions fully explain why corporations should
or should not receive constitutional rights and what the scope of those
rights should be.”59 One sensible response to this conclusion is to focus
54. See generally John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655 (1926).
55. See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1527 (2004)
(describing the impact of Dewey’s article).
56. Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the
Firm, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 281-83 (2014) (describing ways that shareholders can implement
their views, including charter and bylaw amendments).
57. Id. The Supreme Court majority in Citizens United also emphasized the role of corporate
process as justifying the application of perspectives a particular shareholder might not agree with. See,
e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (stating that “prompt
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold
corporations and elected officials accountable”).
58. As is often pointed out, retail investors often do not vote directly, given that large stakes are
held by mutual funds and other institutions. Although these deviations are often cited as a reason to
put little weight on voting, for-profit corporations seem, at least, as representative of their constituents
as many other institutions. For instance, universities often take positions that many of their employees
and students disagree with.
59. Pollman, supra note 45, at 1660.
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less on the theories and more on the purpose of the constitutional right or
other issue in question.60 I adopt a different strategy in the discussion that
follows, retaining aspects of the traditional theories but reconceptualizing
them. The foundation for this approach comes from an unlikely place:
Christian theology.61 Theologian Curtis Chang recently proposed that
corporations have the same characteristics as one of the most mysterious
features of the Christian faith, the Trinity.62 This Part of the Article
explains and develops a Trinitarian conception of corporate personhood.
The first section provides the theological context and the second develops
the Trinitarian conception.
A. The Theological Context
The use of Christian theology to understand corporate personhood is
in one sense quite fitting. The earliest corporations emerged in the Catholic
Church. As one scholar explains:
The recovery of Roman law of corporations in the 11th century
revitalized the Church’s use of the corporate form, which, after
adaptation by canon lawyers, was deployed to reform, and create, a
host of corporate bodies—monasteries, nunneries, cathedral chapters,
bishoprics, confraternities, universities, and so on—which
mushroomed across Europe.63

The first thing to note about corporations from a Christian
perspective is that they are part of the created order. Creation usually calls
to mind the creation of the physical universe—God’s creation of light, the
oceans, the earth, plants, and animals as recounted in the opening chapters
of Genesis.64 However, the created order also includes invisible entities
such as institutions. The New Testament often speaks about principalities,
60. See, e.g., id. at 1675 (“Courts should grant corporations a particular constitutional right only
when doing so would serve the purpose of that right.”); see also Owen Alderson, Abandoning
Corporate Ontology: Original Economic Principles and the Constitutional Corporation, 22 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 561, 584 (2020) (concluding that “business corporations ought to be granted a constitutional
protection otherwise attributable to natural persons only if the purpose of the protection is economic
liberty enhancing, in that it enhances the organization’s free agency to obtain and hold property and
enter into contracts in the way that it sees fit”).
61. Others have offered theological accounts of other aspects of corporations. For example, see
generally MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION (1981).
62. See, e.g., Henry Kaestner, William Norvell, & Rusty Rueff, Episode 91 – Can a Business Be
Christian? With Curtis Chang, FAITH DRIVEN ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.faithdrivenentrepreneur.org/podcast-inventory/2020/2/4/curtis-chang
[https://perma.cc/EPE6-PM4Z].
63. David Ciepley, Corporate Directors as Purpose Fiduciaries: Reclaiming the Corporate Law
We Need 26 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For a fascinating historical analysis of the
evolution of the metaphor of the corporation as a “body,” see generally Amanda Porterfield, The
Religious Roots of Corporate Organization, 44 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 463 (2021).
64. Genesis 1:1–27 (describing creation).
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thrones, and powers. A well-known passage in St. Paul’s letter to the
Colossians brings out these intangible features of creation. Paul writes that
“by [Christ] all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and
invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things
were created through him and for him.”65 The principal focus of the
passage is Christ’s role as the agent of creation. 66 But the passage makes
clear that the creation includes the authority of political leaders, as well as
other types of “thrones or dominions.”67
Two features of the creation of things tangible and intangible are of
particular relevance for my purposes. First, the Bible suggests that the
creation is in some sense a reflection of God. The Bible says, for instance,
in one of the most familiar of the Psalms, that “[t]he heavens declare the
glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his handiwork.”68 According
to another passage, it “is he who made the earth by his power, who
established the world by his wisdom, and by his understanding stretched
out the heavens.”69 These passages suggest that the universe was created
by God as an expression of his wisdom and glory, and thus it is
comprehensible. There is an order to the universe—not a simple order, but
order nonetheless—and that order is an echo of God.
Second, human beings are made in the image of God: “So God
created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male
and female he created them.”70 One implication of being made in the
image of God is that we too have a creative role, since creativity is central
to the God in whose image we were made. We exercise these powers when
we create tangible artifacts such as buildings or art and less tangible
institutions such as corporations and other business enterprises. These
creations too will in some way echo God, both because they are part of the
universe God created and because their human creators are made in the
image of God. The echo I propose to pursue is the echo in corporate
personhood of the Trinitarian nature of God, as Christians understand him.
B. Trinitarian Corporate Personhood
To develop the Trinitarian account of corporate personhood, this
section begins by describing the Trinity in slightly more detail, then briefly
considers its relevance to tangible human creations, such as art, before
turning to corporations. The discussion acknowledges the obvious
65. Colossians 1:16.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Psalms 19:1.
69. Jeremiah 10:12.
70. Genesis 1:27.
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differences between the Trinity and the corporation but concludes that a
Trinitarian account of the corporation better explains corporate
personhood than the traditional theories of corporate personhood.
The Trinity is one of the most mysterious features of Christian belief.
According to Christian scripture, God is a single being, but he consists of
three persons: God the Father, God the Son (Jesus), and God the Holy
Spirit. Augustine puts it this way in The Trinity:
[A]ccording to the scriptures Father and Son and Holy Spirit in the
inseparable equality of one substance present a divine unity; and
therefore there are not three gods but one God; although indeed the
Father has begotten the Son, and therefore he who is the Father is not
the Son; and the Son is begotten by the Father; and the Holy Spirit is
neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and of
the Son, himself coequal to the Father and the Son, and belonging to
the threefold unity.”71

After explicating at length the distinctive roles and ultimate unity of
the three persons of God in the first eight “books” of The Trinity,
Augustine argues for much of the remainder of the work that, since human
beings are made in the image of God, we too have Trinitarian qualities. As
Augustine more elegantly puts it:
[W]e indeed recognize in ourselves the image of God, that is, of the
supreme Trinity, an image which, though it be not equal to God, or
rather, though it be very far removed from Him . . . is yet nearer to
him in nature than any other of his works.72

Although Augustine goes on to identify other Trinitarian features of
human beings,73 he identifies the core Trinitarian features of human beings
as the facts that we have existence, which corresponds to God’s role as
Father in the Trinity; knowledge of our existence, the Son; and love, the
Holy Spirit: “For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know.
And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing,
namely my love, which is of equal moment.”74
When Augustine describes human beings as being “nearer [to God]
in nature than any of his other works,”75 he suggests that the echoes of the
Trinity are strongest in human beings, since we are made in God’s image.
But he also implies—rightly, in my view—that there will also be echoes
in other aspects of creation, and in those things created by human beings
71. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE TRINITY, supra note 10, at 69.
72. Id. at 370 (Book XIV).
73. In Book XIV, for instance, he suggests there are Trinitarian features in both literal and
internal sight. Id. at 304–11.
74. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 9, at 256.
75. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE TRINITY, supra note 10, at 370.
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as well. The echoes may be more attenuated, but they are intrinsic to the
nature of creation.
Before we turn to corporations, consider a possible echo of Trinity in
our creation of more tangible artifacts such as painting, poetry, and other
forms of art. Although people experience beauty differently, many of us
find art that has a tension between unity and separateness—just as the
Trinity has—especially beautiful. This tension is central to many of the
most famous lyric poems, John Keat’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” which
explores the fleeting nature of life and permanence of the life depicted on
the urn, and somehow brings both into the unity of the poem. This tension
is also found in prominent theories of art such as Michelangelo’s emphasis
on figures that seem to strain in opposite directions (“contrapunto”) and
Hans Hofmann’s “push-pull” theory of abstract art.76 In both cases,
seeming opposites coexist within a unified whole.
As Curtis Chang pointed out, corporations also have Trinitarian
qualities. A corporation is “an image of God that, in reflection of the
Trinity, has a distinct identity that is at one intimately related to but at the
same time not collapsible into its constituent members.”77
An obvious distinction between the Trinity and human institutions,
such as corporations, is that a manager’s or other constituency’s role in the
corporation is only one part of his or her life; it is not the entirety of the
person’s existence. A corporate manager may also be a director of one or
more companies and have additional roles as well. The corporate manager
may also be a parent, a child, and/or a spouse—each of which is separate
from the corporate manager role. The corporation is not all encompassing
in the same sense that God is all encompassing for the three persons of the
Trinity. This is one way in which a corporation is only an echo of the
Trinity. But the echo is central to what a corporation is.
The Trinitarian perspective suggests that none of the principal
theories of corporate personhood is quite right. A corporation does in fact
have a distinct, unified existence—it is a real entity—which means that
the aggregate theory is incomplete.78 However, it is not solely a unified

76. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, TRUE PARADOX: HOW CHRISTIANITY MAKES SENSE OF OUR
COMPLEX WORLD 80–82 (2014).
77. Email from Curtis Chang to David Skeel (Jan. 6, 2020). My use of the term “members” is
deliberately ambiguous and designed to include shareholders, managers, and directors.
78. For a careful analysis of the features of the corporation that make its status as an entity both
inevitable and essential, see Asaf Raz, A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law, 65 VILLANOVA L.
REV. 523, 539–48 (2020).
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entity. A corporation also reflects the personalities and other
characteristics of its constituent members.79
Recall that the sovereign grant theory has largely disappeared from
American thinking about corporate personhood.80 From a Trinitarian
perspective, this shift has made corporations more Trinitarian than they
once were. If the sovereign were to exercise strict control over a corporate
entity, as American states once did, the corporation would function more
as an extension of the state and less as an independent entity with robust
Trinitarian qualities. For-profit corporations are thus more fully
Trinitarian when they are less constrained by the state than they were in
the early years of the Republic.
The decision whether to give corporations this flexibility has
important implications for a nation’s political system. In a world where
corporations are distinct from the sovereign, as in the United States today,
and are thus genuinely Trinitarian, they play a mediating role between the
state and individual citizens. For-profit corporations serve as
“intermediate institutions”— just as churches, universities, bowling
leagues, charitable organizations, and labor unions do.81 In both the
Catholic and Protestant traditions, intermediate institutions are viewed as
essential to a healthy modern society. Under the concept of “sphere
sovereignty” advocated by Dutch theologian and politician Abraham
Kuyper, the state generally should not interfere with the organic
development of the business world, art world, and religious institutions,
among others; each is a distinct “sphere” that serves as a check on the
state.82 Another corporate law scholar who shares this perspective has
written that “[s]ocial institutions—including both the state and the
corporation—are organized horizontally, none subordinated to the others,
each having a sphere of authority governed by its own ordering
79. Note that this is analogous in some ways to the philosophical idea of the one and the many.
See, e.g., Gareth B. Matthews & S. Marc Cohen, The One and the Many, 4 REV. OF METAPHYSICS
630 (1968).
80. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 45, at 1661–62 (concluding that “the description of
corporations as a concession from a particular state seems a poor fit in our modern, global
environment”). This perspective has not disappeared altogether: Leo Strine’s writing on corporate
personhood has a sovereign grant dimension at times. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451, 521 (stating that “it may be the case
that, as in Delaware, state law has made a definitive legal determination about the existential status of
a particular form of legal entity, in which case, of course, no further inquiry would be required”).
81. The decline of civic organizations, an important form of intermediate organization, was the
subject of Robert Putnam’s famous study. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
82. See, e.g., ABRAHAM KUYPER, A CENTENNIAL READER 461, 467 (James D. Bratt ed., 1998);
ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM. The Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity, which dates
back to the 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum and has significantly influenced recent European Union
jurisprudence, has a similar and more fully developed emphasis on local institutions.
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principles.”83 Embracing this emphasis on the virtues of robustly
Trinitarian corporations adds a normative dimension to the descriptive
claims of the Trinitarian perspective.
The descriptive claim is that corporations do in fact have the
Trinitarian qualities I have described—on the one hand, they are real
entities, entirely distinct from the state, and on the other hand, they are the
individual persons of their managers, shareholders, and other members.
My normative claim is that the regulation of corporations—including the
extent to which they should enjoy constitutional protection—should be
designed to foster their Trinitarian features.84 This does not mean that
corporations should be free from regulation. Indeed, protecting the
Trinitarian nature of corporations sometimes requires aggressive
regulation, for example, when a handful of companies threaten to
dominate an industry.
I should note that one could reach many of the same conclusions
through a secular analysis of the corporation.85 The Trinitarian approach
differs primarily in my contention that it is it is more than simply a
metaphor; the Trinitarian perspective accurately describes reality.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRINITARIAN CORPORATION
Having developed the Trinitarian perspective on corporate
personhood, this Part of the Article considers its implications for a variety
of issues. The Trinitarian perspective does not provide simple answers to
all of the vexed issues considered thus far, such as whether a corporation
can have a religious identity. But it enables a clearer, and in my view, more
compelling analysis of the underlying issues.
A. Close Corporation Personhood
The recent Supreme Court cases reflect a vision of the corporation as
a projection of its individual members and having no existence beyond the
83. Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 895. Paul Horwitz has provided a much more extensive
Kuyperian analysis of institutions in his work advocating an institutional approach to the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. See also Ronald J. Columbo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS.
L. REV. 1, 85 (2013) (characterizing corporations as countering the government’s homogeneity). See
generally Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44
HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTY L. REV. 79 (2009).
84. The point here is analogous to the arguments religious institutionalists have made for
construing the religion clauses of the First Amendment in institutional terms. For instance, Rick
Garnett proposes that scholars “ask whether religious institutions—healthy, independent, free, diverse
institutions—are not also among the necessary conditions for everyone else’s religious freedom.”
Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Toward an Institutional Understanding of the Religion
Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 293 (2008); see also Horwitz, supra note 83, at 81–83.
85. See generally Matthews & Cohen, supra note 79 (noting the similarity to the idea of “the one
and the many”).

2021]

The Corporation as Trinity

173

individual members. The purpose of corporate personhood is simply “to
provide protection for human beings,” as Justice Alito put it in Hobby
Lobby.86 It is worth pausing to speculate why a majority of the Court has
repeatedly characterized corporations in such non-Trinitarian terms. The
answers will lead us to a consideration of the personhood of close
corporations.
One possibility is simply that conservative jurists have tended to
adopt the aggregate concept of the corporation historically, and the justices
in the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby majorities all hail from the
conservative side of the spectrum. This is possible but seems unsatisfying,
given the century-old lesson from philosopher John Dewey that the same
outcomes can be reached from the real entity and aggregate perspectives.87
A more plausible explanation is that the rights at stake in these
cases— free speech and religious freedom—are easier to conceptualize as
rights of individuals rather than of groups. Indeed, in Grosjean v.
American Press Co., which struck down a tax imposed on big newspapers
under Governor Huey Long of Louisiana and was the first case extending
liberty rights to corporations, the Supreme Court almost entirely ignored
the fact that the newspapers in question were corporations.88 As Adam
Winkler recounts, “in the [J]ustices’ internal debate over how to view the
tax, one of the central issues in the case was obscured: the newspapers
were corporations claiming to have liberty rights.”89
Subsequent developments in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
free speech rights further encouraged the tendency to treat the corporate
entity as if it does not exist. Starting with Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,90 the Court began
focusing less on the speaker’s freedom of speech in corporate free speech
cases, and more on the right of listeners to hear the messages that are being
conveyed.91 The emphasis on listeners’ rights further deflects attention
from the corporation as source of the speech.
A final explanation is that these cases have each involved
corporations that are owned and operated by a small number of
individuals—so-called “close corporations.”92 The corporation in Citizens
86. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014).
87. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
88. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244–45 (1936).
89. WINKLER, supra note 48, at 253–54.
90. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
91. See, e.g., WINKLER, supra note 48, at 294–95 (describing the listeners’ rights theory of the
First Amendment).
92. Although there is no precise definition of a close corporation, a close corporation is one that
has a relatively small number of shareholders. The shareholders who hold a controlling stake in the
business often are members of the same family. Delaware defines close corporations (for the purposes

174

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:155

United was created by a small group of political operatives. Although the
businesses in Hobby Lobby are quite large, each is owned by a small
number of family members. Close corporations like these are the type of
entities that can most easily be visualized as a manifestation of their
individual members.
Supreme Court Justices are not the only ones who are tempted to
think of close corporations simply as an extension of their shareholdermanagers. Close corporations have long been characterized as
“incorporated partnerships.”93 The phrase is not inherently inaccurate
because the equity holders are also the ones who manage the business,
which is similar to a partnership.94 However, it invites the mistaken
assumption that close corporations are simply the sum of their members.
The temptation is especially strong if the business is owned and managed
by a single family.95 Yet, even family businesses have a personality—a
presence—distinct from the family members who run the business.96 For
instance, if two cousins with distinct personalities run a bakery or another
small business, the business will have a personality that differs from either
of the individual cousins. The separate personality of a small business
whose owners are not related may be even more distinct.
The Trinity itself illustrates the consequences of seeing only the
individual members and losing sight of the larger unity of the corporation.
In the accounts of Jesus’s ministry in the four Gospels, Jesus is often seen
to the apparent exclusion of the other two persons of God. It is easy to
imagine that Jesus’s ministry stands or falls by itself, apart from the larger
unity of which it is a part. And indeed, there have long been efforts to
characterize his ministry in just these terms, as with suggestions by some
theologians over the past century that Jesus is not divine, but that his

of its special close corporation provisions) as corporations whose stock is “held of record by not more
than a specified number of persons, not exceeding 30.” DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1).
93. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U.L. REV.
257, 266 (2015) (“[S]cholars . . . have written persuasively that close corporations should be
conceptualized as incorporated partnerships . . . .”); see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d
551, 557 (N.C. 1983) (“[C]ommentators all appear to agree that ‘[c]lose corporations are often little
more than incorporated partnerships.’”) (citation omitted).
94. Moreover, even partnerships now are treated as separate entities for most legal purposes. See
UPA § 201(a) (2013) (“A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.”). Taxation is an exception.
See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-Ups, 57 TAX L.
REV. 137, 164 n.111 (2003) (“The partnership tax rules take an aggregate approach rather than an
entity approach . . . .”).
95. The real reason for this may be that the family itself is an organic entity—one of Kuyper’s
sovereign spheres. See KUYPER, supra note 82.
96. For an effort to identify and describe the nature of the “spirit” of a corporation, see generally
Russell Powell, Spirit of the Corporation, 44 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 371 (2021).
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ethical teachings are compelling.97 But the Gospels repeatedly make clear
that it is a mistake to view Jesus solely in isolation. When Jesus is baptized,
God, as Father, says, “this is my Son, with whom I am well pleased,”98
keeping the larger unity of the Trinity clearly in view. Similarly, the
description of Jesus calming the stormy waters when he and his disciples
are sailing across the Sea of Galilee echoes the account of God bringing
order out of chaos in Genesis 1, thus serving as a reminder that Jesus
cannot be understood apart from God.99 He is at this moment the most
visible agent of the larger unity.
Close corporations and other human institutions have similar
qualities. One or more individual members may be especially visible, and
it is tempting to ignore the larger entity. At times individual members may
be the relevant focus, as when an action against the corporation directly
implicates individual rights.100 But even with a close corporation, the
corporation is more than its individual members.
B. Noncorporate Personhood
While the personhood of corporations is my principal focus, much of
the logic of the Trinitarian model applies to other institutions, even if they
are not formally incorporated. Even associations that do not have
personhood for technical legal purposes are Trinitarian and do have a
separate existence in the sense I have been describing.
Historically, noncorporate enterprises featured quite prominently in
the debate over personhood and entity status. For instance, trade unions,
which often were not incorporated, were a frequent subject of discussion
and debate in the nineteenth century.101 In a 1922 case, the Supreme Court
suggested that the United Mine Workers (UMW) had entity status.102 The
Court further held that UMW could sue or be sued as an entity, even
though the union at that time was an unincorporated association.103 Chief
Justice Taft writing for the majority stated: “in every way the union acts
as a business entity . . . [n]o organized corporation has greater unity of

97. The classic twentieth century refutation of this view is J. Gresham Machen’s Christianity
and Liberalism, which contends that rejecting the divinity of Jesus is rejecting Christianity. See
generally J. GRESHAM MACHEN, CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERALISM (1923).
98. Matthew 3:17.
99. Mark 4:35–39.
100. See infra Section II(D) (discussing Hale v. Hempel).
101. For an excellent overview of the early nineteenth century personhood debate in Germany
and its transplant to England, see generally Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse
on Corporate Personality Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and
American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421 (2006).
102. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385 (1922).
103. Id. at 387–88.
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action.”104 One can debate whether the outcome in the case was good or
bad from a legal and policy perspective, but the conclusion that UMW had
a separate existence beyond its individual members is undeniable.
To be sure, corporations are often more durable than other business
organizations. The partners of a partnership historically could easily exit
and force a dissolution, as members of an informal association can still
do.105 These noncorporate organizations may be fragile, and it is fair to say
that the more fragile the organization the less robustly Trinitarian it will
be. But every organization has a distinct personality to some extent and
some informal entities may be quite robust, as unincorporated labor unions
were in the early twentieth century. Perhaps the best current illustration of
an association with robust Trinitarian features is the National Collegiate
Athletic Association. 106
The limited liability enjoyed by shareholders of a corporation makes
it easier for corporations to raise large amounts of money, and thus to grow
in size and influence, but it does not necessarily make a corporation more
durable. Rather than limited liability, it is a corporation’s legal entity
status, which makes it more difficult to force a corporation to dissolve or
liquidate, that most directly ensures its durability.107
C. Can Corporations Have a Religious Identity?
Critics of the Hobby Lobby decision insist that corporations cannot
exercise religious belief—only individuals can—and that religious
identity would conflict with for-profit corporations’ responsibility to make
profits for their shareholders.108 Although critics acknowledge that
churches and other non-profit religious organizations have a religious
identity,109 they distinguish churches from for-profit corporations by
describing churches as “exist[ing] to foster the interests of persons

104. See Harris, supra note 101, at 1454 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am., 259 U.S. at 385).
105. This is a major theme of Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s work on the importance
of entity status. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
106. The NCAA qualifies as robust from a variety of perspectives, including its longevity, the
breadth of the organization, and its authority over thousands of student athletes and their schools. The
NCCA
dates
its
origins
back
to
1906.
About
the
NCAA,
NCAA,
https://web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/a
bout%2Bthe%2Bncaa/who%2Bwe%2Bare/about%2Bthe%2Bncaa%2Bhistory
[https://perma.cc/3BC8-F2X4].
107. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 105; see also Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital:
What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV.
387 (2003).
108. See discussion supra Section I.B.
109. Id.
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subscribing to the same religious faith,”110 whereas for-profit corporations
are heterogeneous.
Viewed in isolation, this is an odd line of critique. The beliefs of
members of religious organizations are often quite heterogenous, which
suggests that the line between religious organizations and a religiously
oriented for-profit corporation may not be sharp in this regard. Nor does
the profit-making feature of for-profit corporations preclude religious
identity in any obvious way. Corporations have always been able to
incorporate religious or social objectives if their shareholders and directors
desire it. As noted earlier, the principal critique of Benefit Corporations is
that they are superfluous—their benefits can be achieved with an ordinary
corporation.111
When Hobby Lobby was decided, some advocates of the Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) movement, who contend that corporations
should not focus solely on the interests of shareholders, argued that Hobby
Lobby vindicated their vision of corporate governance.112 Although others
reject this interpretation of Hobby Lobby and insist that Hobby Lobby and
CSR do not belong together,113 one aspect of the enthusiasts’ analogy is
accurate: Hobby Lobby and CSR both call for deviations from a singleminded focus on maximizing profits for the benefit of shareholders.114 For
religiously-oriented corporations, religious principles take priority over
profit maximization; similarly, CSR calls for greater attention to
environmental or other social goals, even if this may reduce the
corporation’s profits.
Perhaps the response to Hobby Lobby would have been different if
Citizens United had been decided more narrowly. By refusing to
distinguish media and advocacy corporations from ordinary for-profit
corporations, the Citizens United Court insulated every corporation’s
political engagement from meaningful regulatory oversight. The Court’s
110. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 754 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
111. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70
BUS. LAW. 1, 22–23 (2015); Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L.
REV. 777, 779–80 (2015).
113. Elizabeth Sepper and James Nelson reject the analogy between CSR and corporate religious
identity and contend, among other things, that CSR advocates that corporations do more than the law
requires, whereas firms with a religious identity seek exemptions that permit them to violate the law.
This characterization strikes me as tendentious and inaccurate—religious freedom is in fact protected
by law; it is not a deviation. However, Sepper and Nelson do rightly point out one salient difference
between CSR and corporate religious identity: the protection of religious identity reflects a
commitment to pluralism and difference, whereas CSR advocates principles that are aimed at all
corporations rather than a subset of corporations. Elizabeth Sepper & James D. Nelson, The Religious
Conversion of Corporate Social Responsibility, 71 EMORY L.J. 217 (2021).
114. For similar conclusions, see Johnson & Millon, supra note 112; McDonnell, supra note
112.
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decision in Hobby Lobby might not have prompted such a vehement
response if it had not come so soon after the Court’s sweeping rejection of
campaign finance regulation and had the Court’s holding in Citizens
United been limited to media-related corporations.
Although the claim that for-profit corporations cannot have a
religious identity is unpersuasive, critics of Hobby Lobby rightly point out
that it should not be enough that prominent shareholder-managers of the
business are personally religious, as the Court seems to suggest.115 The
Court’s reference to protections for “people like the Hahns and Greens”116
obscured what should have been the real issue in the case: whether the
corporation itself, not just individual members, is religiously oriented.
Corporate law provides considerable guidance on this issue.117 The
strongest evidence of corporate commitment to religious (or any other)
principles is a provision in the certificate of incorporation because charter
provisions are approved by both the directors and shareholders.118 The
next strongest evidence is the corporate bylaws, which can be adopted or
removed by either the directors or the shareholders.119 Thus, while bylaws
are less permanent and foundational than charter provisions, bylaws can
create a strong presumption that the corporation is religiously oriented. A
directorial resolution adopting a religiously oriented mission statement
would be similar to a bylaw because it would be weaker than a charter
provision but relatively strong evidence of religious orientation.120

115. As with the Court’s statement that, through RFRA, “Congress provided protection for
people like the Hahns and Greens.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014).
As this comment reflects, I am skeptical of the “reverse veil piercing” idea that the values of the
individual shareholders are infused to the corporation.
116. Id.
117. My colleague Elizabeth Pollman worries that treating for-profit corporations as religiously
oriented puts state corporate law in the position of defining constitutional rights, because it “gives a
quasi-constitutional dimension to governance rules that were developed in a different era and with a
different focus.” Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 639
(2016) (emphasis omitted). This is a serious and important concern; but, in my view, the tension is
alleviated by the fact that the general rules for altering corporate charters and bylaws are well-settled.
Additionally, federal courts are not required to defer to a state’s interpretation of its corporate
governance rules in applying the Constitution or a federal statute such as the RFRA.
118. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2014).
119. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2015). Although directors can amend the bylaws
only if the charter gives them authority, charters regularly do.
120. Professor Catherine Hardee has argued that proper corporate adoption of a commitment to
religious identity should not be treated as sufficient, due to concerns such as the possibility that a
minority of shareholders may sometimes be able to secure adoption of a commitment that a majority
of shareholders do not share. She proposes that courts use a balancing test that considers additional
factors, such as the extent of the proponents’ financial interests. See generally Catherine A. Hardee,
Schrodinger’s Corporation: The Paradox of Religious Sincerity in Heterogeneous Corporations, 61
B.C.L. REV. 1763 (2020). In my view, properly adopted commitments should be honored, and
disgruntled shareholders should be protected with ordinary corporate law doctrines such as fiduciary
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By contrast, the fact that the chief executive is a religious believer is
much weaker evidence because the chief executive, acting alone, does not
ordinarily have the authority to speak for the corporation on major issues,
such as religious identity.121 In Trinitarian terms, looking at individual
members focuses on the wrong dimension of the corporation; the corporate
entity, which acts through its board of directors, must be considered. There
may be exceptions, even with publicly-held corporations, for example
when the chief executive is so clearly the public face of the corporation
that the chief executive’s views have nearly the force of a directorial
decision.122 But ordinarily, the CEO’s views are simply the views of a
corporate officer—a powerful officer, to be sure, but one who lacks the
authority to make major decisions unilaterally on behalf of the firm.
Applying this logic to the two main corporations in Hobby Lobby,
neither had either a charter provision or a bylaw reflecting its religious
principles. The most relevant evidence of the corporations’ religious
principles was not the controlling families’ religious beliefs, as the
majority suggests.123 It was the firms’ mission statements, reflecting their
religious principles together with the fact that the companies were being
run in accordance with the principles.124
In practice, courts tend to take individuals’ claims of sincerity at face
value, rather than conducting a searching inquiry.125 A similar deference
is appropriate for a corporation that can point to evidence of its religious

duty and oppression remedies, if there were a case of abuse (such as a controlling shareholder adopting
principles that destroy the value of the firm).
121. Under traditional corporate law doctrine, the chief executive has the authority to make
ordinary decisions but more important issues require the approval of the board of directors. See, e.g.,
Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357, 365–70 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959). See also
In re Mulco Prods., Inc., 123 A.2d 95, 103–05 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956); Lucey v. Hero Int’l Corp., 281
N.E.2d 266, 268–70 (Mass. 1972).
122. Even Delaware courts have acknowledged this in the famous Disney case. Although the
decision to fire a high-level executive would seem to be a Board decision as a matter of corporate
authority, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Michael Eisner, Disney’s imperial CEO at the time,
had this authority himself. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 68 (Del. 2006).
123. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014) (“Congress
provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens.”).
124. Hobby Lobby has a statement of purpose committing those who hold shares and manage
the business to “[honor] the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company in a manner consistent
with Biblical principles.” Id. at 703.
125. See Vita Nuova, Inc. v. Azar, No. 4:19-CV-00532-O, 2020 WL 8271942, at *7 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 2, 2020) (collecting quotations highlighting this low standard for showing sincerity); Danville
Christian Acad., Inc. v. Beshear, 503 F. Supp. 3d 516, 523 (E.D. Ky. 2020) (finding that a religious
school held a sincere belief that its instruction must be conducted in person, despite the fact that it had
briefly suspended in-person instruction when a student tested positive for COVID); see also On Fire
Christian Ctr., Inc. v. Fischer, 453 F. Supp. 3d 901, 911–12 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (conducting a nonsearching evaluation of the sincerity of a church’s belief that it must hold its Easter services in-person
during the pandemic).
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identity.126 Although critics of Hobby Lobby often worry about the
difficulty of determining the sincerity of a corporation’s religious
identity,127 the assessment is easier with a corporation than an individual
given the likelihood that there will be objective evidence (e.g. from charter
provisions, bylaws, or mission statements) of the corporation’s religious
identity.
This does not mean the behavior of the corporation and its
stakeholders is irrelevant when the corporation purports to have adopted a
religious identity. If the corporation acts inconsistently with its religious
identity, a rejection might be appropriate in some cases. One factor that
can confirm a corporation’s religious identity, despite inconsistent
behavior, is the strength and enforceability of its commitment to the
religious identity. If the commitment is strongly binding, deviations
should not be seen as negating the religious identity, because the
deviations can be corrected by shareholders who are unhappy with the
shift. Suppose, for example, that a corporation commits to closing on
Sundays in furtherance of its Christian principles but begins opening on
Sundays. If the commitment to Sunday closing is in the certificate of
incorporation, shareholders could take legal action to enforce the
certificate.128 Although a bylaw is more easily removable, a violation of a
specific bylaw provision could also be challenged through litigation. Less
formal mission statements would be more difficult to police. A court
should therefore be more skeptical of a firm’s purported religious identity
if it fails to adhere to an informal mission statement.
Another possible complication is whether the exemption that a
corporation wishes to claim is consistent with its religious identity.
Consider the contraception mandate in the ACA. A corporation’s claim
126. For an argument that courts can determine whether religious claims are genuine or
pretextual by focusing on factors such as the potential benefits of the claims to the claimant and
whether the individual’s behavior is consistent with the claim, see generally Ben Adams & Cynthia
Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
59 (2014).
127. A group of law professors raised the ominous specter of corporations having “Road to
Damascus” conversions—that is, purporting to have a religious identity when the opportunity to take
advantage of a beneficial religious exemption arose—if the Hobby Lobby Court held, as it later did,
that religiously oriented corporations are protected by RFRA. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Corp. &
Crim. L. Professors in Support of Petitioners at 26–27, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, 571 U.S. 1067
(2013) (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356).
128. See, e.g., Telcom-SNI Invs., L.L.C. v. Sorrento Networks, Inc., No. CIV.A. 19038-NC,
2001 WL 1117505 at *4, *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2001), aff’d, 790 A.2d 477 (Del. 2002) (enjoining a
corporation from incurring additional debt and from issuing additional preferred stock because these
actions would violate the corporation’s certificate of incorporation); Mariner LDC v. Stone Container
Corp., 729 A.2d 267, 269, 279–80 (Del. Ch. 1998) (plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
claiming that a proposed merger violated the corporation’s certificate of incorporation; court
entertained the suit but ultimately denied relief on the merits).
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that it should not be required to include any contraceptives in its insurance
coverage would be more consistent with a Catholic than a Protestant
evangelical identity, given that most Protestant evangelicals view
abortions, but not contraceptives, as inconsistent with Christian
principles.129 In many cases, any ambiguity is easily resolved. If the firm
clearly identified as Catholic, the objection to contraceptives would be
consistent with its values. If its values were evangelical, on the other hand,
the objection would be more debatable. In this case, a court should assess
the sincerity of the objection using the same metrics and deference as when
individuals assert religious objections elsewhere.130
It is important to remember that any assertion of religious identity is
also subject to laws such as the RFRA. Suppose, for instance, that a
religiously-oriented business insisted that a federal mask mandate at the
height of a pandemic violated its religious principles. Even if the business
could show that its religious principles precluded it from requiring its
employees to wear masks, the government could probably demonstrate
that the mandate satisfied RFRA’s requirement that any substantial burden
on religious exercise be justified by a compelling governmental interest
achieved through the least restrictive means.131 If the mandate came from
a state rather than Congress, it would be even more likely to be upheld.
Because RFRA does not apply to states, neutral state laws can be applied
to churches and other religious organizations.132 It also bears noting that
the worries of Hobby Lobby’s critics that the case would prompt large
numbers of “for-profit entities to seek religion-based exemptions from
regulations they deem offensive to their faith” have not materialized.133

129. In Hobby Lobby, the corporations (Hobby Lobby was evangelical, Conestoga Wood was
Mennonite) challenged only four drugs that were required as part of the contraception mandate, based
on the view that the drugs were a form of abortion. They did not challenge the broader mandate, as
some Catholic organizations did. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 700–01 (2014)
(Hahns, the owners of Conestoga, are Mennonite and they challenged “four FDA-approved
contraceptives that may operate after the fertilization of an egg”); id. at 703 (Greens are “Christians”
who buy “ads inviting people to ‘know Jesus as Lord and Savior’”).
130. Nathan Chapman has argued that a fraud or misrepresentation standard should be used.
Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1209–12, 1228–29
(2017).
131. For a discussion of the RFRA requirements, see Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 705 (stating that
the government is prohibited from “substantially burdening” religious exercise absent a “compelling
governmental interest” pursued through the “least restrictive means”).
132. By its original terms, RFRA applied to both state and federal laws, but the Supreme Court
struck it down as applied to states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–36 (1997), superseded
by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, as
recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (holding that RFRA exceeded Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers as applied to states).
133. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Questions about for-profit corporations’ religious identities have thus far
been more hypothetical than real.
D. Varieties of Corporate Rights
The Trinitarian perspective, with its emphasis on pluralism and
diversity among corporations, endorses the view that some types of
corporations should be entitled to different rights than others. Given the
solicitude the Constitution shows for media and the press, the majority in
Citizens United could have easily construed the First Amendment to
provide greater protection of the speech of press organizations than nonpress organizations. A prominent constitutional law scholar has argued
that the Press Clause of the First Amendment provides a basis for such a
distinction.134 If the Court had struck down the campaign finance
regulation as it applied to Citizens United under the Press Clause, the
decision might have been far less controversial.
It is important to be careful when handling these distinctions,
however. Some scholars have suggested that the key issue in Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby is expressive rights, and that a corporation’s
speech or religious freedom should be protected only if it was created for
expressive purposes.135 Citizens United would qualify under this test,
Hobby Lobby would not. The problem with this approach is that it treats
the corporation simply as a vehicle for its members’ speech or expression
of belief, and it ignores the corporation as a separate entity.136 The
Trinitarian perspective underscores that both need to be taken into account.
In some contexts, focusing on the corporate entity may justify giving
a corporation less constitutional protection than an individual would enjoy.
A good illustration is an early twentieth century Supreme Court case called
Hale v. Henkel.137 Hale, the secretary and treasurer of MacAndrews &
Forbes Company, refused to produce documents sought in an antitrust
investigation of the tobacco industry, invoking the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and to
avoid self-incrimination.138 Characterizing the corporation differently in
different parts of the opinion, the Supreme Court held that corporations do
134. Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE
L.J. 412, 416–19 (2013).
135. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 40, at 254–65.
136. The Supreme Court unfortunately has invited this tendency by overvaluing expressive
rights and undervaluing the rights of assembly and association. John Inazu has emphasized this point
in his work. See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
(2012); John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L.
REV. 149 (2010).
137. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
138. Id. at 45–46.
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have Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches,139 but
that they do not have Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination.140 Given that the corporation was the focus of the
investigation, and a corporation does not face the risk of incarceration, the
reduced scope of protection was sensible in a case like Hale.
But a more nuanced analysis of the dual nature of the corporation—
as both entity and individuals—would recognize that more robust
protections are appropriate if the real target of an investigation is the
individual managers or the shareholders and not the corporation itself.141
The distinction can be framed in evidentiary terms. If a corporation is the
subject of an investigation, it should presumptively have more limited
Fourth Amendment rights and no Fifth Amendment rights. But the
presumption should give way if individuals are the principal target of the
investigation.
E. Corporate Political Engagement
The Citizens United decision prompted a spirited debate about
whether corporations should be required to disclose their political
expenditures or submit them to shareholders for approval, so that their
political involvement would be more open to scrutiny.142 More recently,
Coca Cola and other prominent corporations have spoken out about racism
and voting rights, spurred by the renewed focus on social justice since the
murder of George Floyd. James Quincey, the chairman and chief executive
officer of Coca Cola, released a statement saying, “We want to be crystal
clear and state unambiguously that we are disappointed in the outcome of
the Georgia voting legislation,” and that “our focus is now on supporting
federal legislation that protects voting access and addresses voter
suppression across the country.”143 Some of those who criticized measures

139. Id. at 76. In subsequent cases, the Court made it clear that the Fourth Amendment rights of
corporations are more limited than the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals. See, e.g., William J.
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 428–35 (1995).
140. Hale, 201 U.S. at 70.
141. For an extensive, and compelling, defense of this view and criticism of the Supreme Court’s
“artificial entity” exception to the Fifth Amendment, see Tracey Maclin, Long Overdue: Fifth
Amendment Protection for Corporate Officers, 101 B.U.L. REV. 1523, 1527 (2021) (stating that “the
fact that a corporation cannot invoke the Fifth does not explain why a person who works for a
corporation cannot”).
142. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?,
124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2010); see generally John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics,
Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 659
(2012).
143. Statement from James Quincey on Georgia Voting Legislation, THE COCA-COLA CO. (Apr.
1, 2021), https://www.coca-colacompany.com/media-center/georgia-voting-legislation
[https://perma.cc/XSL2-9SG2].
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that would chill political expenditures were unhappy about the recent
corporate statements, and vice versa.144
A frequent argument for constraints on political spending by publicly
held for-profit corporations is that the spending inevitability conflicts with
the views of many of the corporation’s heterogenous shareholders.145 In
my view, this critique is not compelling. Corporations are a form of
representative democracy, not a direct democracy with shareholder veto
power over speech or decisions they do not approve of. The voting and
decision-making process is imperfect, to be sure, but shareholders are
bound by the results. If additional controls are needed, it is not because
shareholders are heterogeneous.146
A similar response also holds true for complaints about the recent
social activism by prominent corporations. In 2021, many shareholders
were unhappy, while others rejoiced, when Coca Cola’s chief executive
criticized the voting legislation in Georgia.147 But making public
statements is a director’s prerogative, absent a charter provision, bylaw, or
commitment precluding a director from commenting on social issues.
From a Trinitarian perspective, the principal problem is not that
political engagement may conflict with some shareholders’ values. The
danger is that political engagement can tie corporations too closely with
the state, compromising their role as truly Trinitarian intermediate
institutions. The risk increases when businesses have a dominant industry
position. These corporations have an incentive to support the
government’s candidates and channel government policy in exchange for
protection from potential competition.
The best response to this Trinitarian problem—excessively close ties
between large corporations and the state, which undermines a
corporation’s separateness—is effective antitrust enforcement. From the
Trinitarian perspective, recent efforts to police corporate concentration
more aggressively and to ensure competition within a given industry,
144. See, e.g., Philip Elliott, Mitch McConnell Tries to Have it Both Ways on Corporate Cash,
TIME (Apr. 7, 2021), https://time.com/5953044/mitch-mcconnell-mlb-georgia/
[https://perma.cc/X4YP-43B9] (stating that “[Senate Minority Leader Mitch] McConnell, a steadfast
critic of limits on campaign finance systems and one of the biggest boosters of corporate money in
politics, told reporters yesterday that corporations should stay out of political fights if they [do not]
want to incur the wrath of consumers”).
145. Victor Brudney was one of the first to make this argument in the scholarly literature. Victor
Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J.
235, 237 (1981).
146. For an argument that the political speech of publicly held corporations is inevitably that of
their top managers, and thus warrants regulation, see Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1372 (1979).
147. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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rather than dominance by one or a few corporations, are more promising
than targeting corporate political engagement. President Biden recently
signed an executive order designed to achieve precisely this objective,
vowing that there would be “[n]o more tolerance of abusive actions by
monopolies. No more bad mergers that lead to massive layoffs, higher
prices[,] and fewer options for workers and consumers alike.”148
Effectively policing corporate concentration would not make
corporate political engagement concerns go away altogether. One can
imagine reforms that might prove beneficial, such as requiring that a
corporation disclose major political contributions. But if one envisions the
business world as a counterbalance to the state, as I do, it is less troubling
that corporations make political expenditures or speak on social issues
when antitrust enforcement is robust than if publicly held corporations
were essentially an extension of the state.
Those who are familiar with Adolf Berle’s work will recognize that
this vision of the corporation is quite different than his,149 and is much
closer to the view Louis Brandeis and his followers advocated during the
New Deal, with its emphasis on promoting competition in every
industry.150 Berle was more comfortable with corporate concentration and
viewed it as inevitable. Whether or not he was right about that—and it is
quite possible he was—he was both prescient and right to insist that
corporations have a much greater moral role than is commonly recognized.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I looked to an unlikely source, the fourth century
theologian Augustine of Hippo, for insight into the nature of the
corporation. I have followed a lead provided by Adolf Berle nearly seventy
years ago, although I took it in a different direction by focusing on The

148. Nandita Bose & Jarrett Renshaw, Biden Signs Order to Tackle Corporate Abuses Across
U.S. Economy, REUTERS (July 10, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/bidens-executive-orderpromote-competition-us-economy-includes-over-70-2021-07-09/
[https://perma.cc/Z973-MSTL].
The executive order is titled Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy.
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021).
149. At least his mature view. For an argument that Berle’s views evolved and that he shifted to
a corporatist perspective in his middle period, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L.
99, 104 (2008).
150. For a discussion of the New Deal debate between Brandeisians and Berle’s more sanguine
view of corporate concentration, see DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2004). Lina Khan and Tim Wu,
among others, have brought renewed attention to the Brandeisian perspective. For discussion, see
generally Jacob M. Schlesinger, The Return of the Trustbusters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28/29, 2021, at C1;
TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: HOW CORPORATE GIANTS CAME TO RULE THE WORLD (2020).
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Trinity rather than The City of God and using it to explore the nature of
corporate personhood.
In contrast to the two leading traditional conceptions of the
corporation—the aggregate and real entity theories151—which are framed
as alternative accounts, the Trinitarian perspective has aspects of each. It
insists that corporations are real entities, but it also recognizes that the
managers and other constituencies of a corporation have independent
significance. I have also argued that corporations can be more Trinitarian
or less, depending on factors such as the extent of state control over the
scope of the corporation or the vigorousness of antitrust enforcement.
On some issues, the Trinitarian theory of corporate personhood does
not deviate significantly from other theories of the corporation, while the
insights are more novel on other issues. By providing a more threedimensional perspective on the nature of a corporation than any traditional
account, the Trinitarian perspective is truer to what a corporation actually
is.

151. As noted earlier, the third traditional theory—concession or sovereign grant—has declined
in importance. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. The Trinitarian account applauds this
decline.

